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r~view

the facts in detail

b~cause

there

apoear to be numerous statements of facts in
Plaintiffs' brief with which we cannot agree.
As Plaintiff state! the property in question was owned in fee by
Hancoc~

Forr~st

on December 22, 1955.

transferring

th~

and Renae

All documents

various interests thereafter

are detailed in Exhibits 12 and 12a, the chart
A simplified outline is as follows:
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-3~-------------HANCOCKS

·-·-·December 22, 1955 (Ex. 1)

SMITHS
'
t
(Ex.
I
i
KARTCHNER
I
Seller's
~
I r-Interest---LYNN
November 10,
f

August

, 19 56

2)

.August 10~ 1956 (In Ex .. 6)

BLO~

1

I

I

I
I

~

1956 (In Ex.,
6)

(Def.)

1-10-57
Ex. o, 7, 8

LEAVITTS

I·------

May 2 7,

1 q 57 (Ex o

9)

·--~

t

Aoril 22,
KARTCHNER and CUTLER
1958
Augu~t 9, 1957 (Ex. 10)
(Ex.

Quit
Claim
Deed

21)

LEAVITTS
April 22,

l ~gOCKS

1

VIN YARD INVESTMENT
Feb. 15, to
March lt 1958
(Ex. 32 J

LEAVITIS
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co.

-4Leavitts and their assignors were
de1inquent from and including the September
payment f0rward.
.. nt on

pa~e

Contrary to their state-

1, the $600.00 did not apply

on the principal or interest of the original
contract, Ex. 1 (Ex. 22 and Ex. 26; testimony of Ramon Child, T. 48, 49).

Further-

more, no additional payments were made to
Hancocks, until $1,500.00 was tendered March
26, 1957.

This was refused by the Hancocks

as being insufficient to catch up the account. (Ex. 11. T. 42,43)
Defendants first payment was due on
December 10, 1956 (T. 111).

Though she

had some difficulty making her payments,
in March she oaid sufficient to cover all
oayments through May, 1957, and the amount
of $471.67 of the June 10, 1957, pavment
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-.5(T. 86, 87).

In the meantime the Hancocka had

served notice (Ex. 16, received - T. 37)
aailed out November 8, 1956, on

Lynn,Saith~

and Kartchner to pay up in five daya or
quit (T. 35).

Although Defendant did not

receive this notice, she was bound by the
notice given her predecessors in title and
occupation. (U. C. A. 1953, Sec. 78-36-7.)
The Hancocks then filed suit #2148
(received T. 11) in which Defendant waa a
party and she was served with Summons on
March 25, 1957.

This action stated that

the Smith Contract, Ex. 1, was terminated,
and asked for eviction and treble damages.
At the time of trial herein, the treble
damages still hung over Defendant's head.
On May 27,

1957, the Hancocks, who

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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had apparently given up on Leavitt, now
entered into a new contract, Ex.

Q,

with

Kartchner and Cutler, which declared the
Smith Contract forfeited.

At this 3tage

Defenda.nt ceased making payments.

By

June 15, 1957, the Smith contract, Ex 1,

was now delinquent from September, 1956,
on. or

$3,000~00,

plus penalties, taxes,

insurance and attorney fees.

By assignment dated August 9, 1957,
Kartchner and Cutler assigned this contract,
Ex. 9, to Vineyard Investment Corporation
(Ex. 10) .
The only payment Kartr:hner and Cutler
made on this contract was by an automobile
which turned out to have been stolen and
was retaken by the owner (T. 76).

Only

one cash payment was made (T. 76) which
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would apply on the June 25th payment.

The

contract provided a 30 day grace period,
so on August 25th the contract was in default.
In the conversation which Defendant
had with Mr. Leavitt in August, 1957, (T.
90) he told her he was straightening things
up.

She told him until she knew everything

was straight, she wouldn't pay him anything.
On December 13, 1957, Defendant was

again sued for eviction and treble damages,
in action #2207 (T. 90).

Upon being advised

by her attorney that she had no defense, she
gave up possession of these premises on
January 21, 1958 (T. 91).
On February 17, 1958, judgment was
entered by stipulation in this matter and
Defendant escaped the threat of attorney
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-8~ e~s

or t r~bl e or other d a.m11ge~ in t iJ !t

ac.~.ion.

\Se~

j~tw~en
19~8,

its i

file 1n #2207).

Pebruar, 15th

March A'

an~

Yin(. yard ... nvestmenr Company conve y .. 'd
~~

teres t

to

I

he Lea v 1 t

t;:)

(

Ex. 3 2 , T .

134),
n~w Hanco~k

PolJow1ng execut1on of a

Leavitt Cont=act (Ex. 21) on April 2~,
.. n e L ,.~a v i t
t

qu i t

he r

t

1958

s de f au 1 t e d out en t i r e 1 y , an d
c 1 aim d ~ e d of Apr i

was duly recorded on

:~
1

rune 27

12 a ). Case #2 2 3 6 was b r ~ u g n t

2 2 , 19 58 ,
~58,

(Ex.

and E1 Ra.n c h..,

rorporation was defau ted out in •nat (see
file).
Substantia,.ly allot

on pages 5, 6 and 7 of

are

erroneou~

or

m~rPly

3la1e~rr~-rts

he

PLaint

1

~~s

br1ef

ar~umentativ

The cout:act of November 10, 1956,
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fixea the value of the Coronado Street
property, accepted as a down payment from
Defendant at $5,000.00.

Defendant's pay-

ments amounted to $2,721.67.

A reasonable

rental was stipulated to be $200.00 a month,
or $2,866.67 during the period of occupancy.
ARGUMENT
POINT~

I AND III

As to Plaintiff's contention that the
trial Court erred in denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment and/or judgment
on the pleadings and that the Court erred
in entering judgment for Defendant on her
counterclaim.
I will discuss these points together
since the issues raised are almost identical.
When Plaintiffs acquired Lynn's seller's
interest in the Blohm contract there can
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10be no question that they stood in her
shoes aa to the Defendant and were obli~ated

to keep the payments up to the fee

title holder and not permit the contract
to be defaulted and the Defendant ousted.
Plaintiffs cite 55 AM. JUR. (Vendor
and Purchaser) Sec. 601 for the general
rule that the Vendee must first tender
payment before the Vendor can be in default.

It should be noted that the last

two sentences are to the following effect:
"However, even though the vendor's
promise is conditioned upon payment
by the purchaser of the purcha8e
price, there may be an obligation to
perform and a breach upon the part
of the vendor without payment or
tender of pa-yment by the purchaser
where payment or tender of payment
would be useless, as ~e the vendor
is unable or refuses to perform.
Accordingly, where performance or
tender of performance by the vendee
would be useless, the vendee need not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11peL~orm or tender performance in
order to re8cind for a breach of
the vendor."

s . . c Lion
p~~if1c.

I

602, however, is even more

quote:

. where there is a defect in or
want of title which the vendor cannot
or will not remedy within the time
allowed for conveyance and perfection
of title even if payment or tender
of payme·n t is made, such ::!ef ec t in or
want of title may be a breach of th~
executory contract which warrants reS\-:ission even though payment is neither
made nor tendered; in such a case
the purchaser need not perform or
tender in order to rescind because of
the defect in or want of title, it
bPing assumed that the defect in or
~~rant of title is such as to warrant
~escission if the purchaser performs
or tenders. This rulP has been applied
where th~ vendor'8 title was subject
to an easem~nt, to a mortgage or other
lien, and to an outstanding lease.
This rule has also been applied where
the vendor had no title to a portion
of the premises wh~re the vendor'•
title h&s b~en terminated by foreclosure of a mortgage or ~ien, and
where title was in a th1rd person and
was not within the contro~ of the
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-12vendor. If a vendor has disabled
himself to convey such titl~ as
he has contracted to convey, the
purchaser's right of rescission is
complete without an offer by the
purchaser to perform. It has been
held in a number of cases that where
the vendor, by reason of having conveyed the property to another, is
unable to perform, an offer to pay
the balance of the purchase money is
unnecessary."
This doctrine is spelled out in 40
A. L. R. at page 700.

The note indicates

that tender is dispensed with where title
of vendor has been terminated by foreclosure
of a mortgage.

In the instant case the

fee title holders had declared the contract
under which Plaintiffs held to be terminated.
After

~orne

further maneuvering Plaintiffs

were foreclosed of all interest in the
property.
To like effect is 59 A. L. R. at page

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

250.

I quote:
'There may be circumstances
which will juetify the vendee in
refusing further to perform, and
enable him to recover the amount
he has paid on the purchase price,
although the time fixed for performance by the vendor has not yet
arrived. Thus, it has been held
that, where the only title the
vendor had to the land he had contracted to sell was as a vendee in
an executory contract for its purchase, and he made default in this
contract, and it was foreclosed,
and the land was sold and purchased
by a third person, this constituted
such a complete change in the title
as entitled the vendee to rescind
and recover the amount he had paid
on the purchase price. Girratano
v. Mcilwain (1926) 215 App. Div.
644, 214 N. Y. Supp. 582."
The most specific note is found in

109 A. L. R. 242.

I quote from page 243:

" . . . whereas if the vendor had an
apparent, and, to some extent at least,
a valid, title, at the time of contracting, the vendee may with some
reason urge that in entering into the
agreement to purchase he relied upon,
or at least assumed, the existence
of potential ownership in the vendor,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and that, conceding he may not com·
plain of defect 3 ''I' encumbrance~
which are within the ~ower of the
vendot: in due time to remove., he
~hou!d not be expected to proceed
with the contract where the fact
develops that there are defects or
encumbrance$ the removal of which
rest~ upon mere hope and conjecture,
a8 where, in the acquisition of
title, the vendor must necesssu i 1 y
be wholly dependent upon the w411
and volition of a third party.)
Many cases in support of the

cl~,...trine

are noted on page 2510
In the instant case we not only have

the institution of foreclosure p
unde.r which the vendor ultimatr·Jy
but

ocee~dings
!o~t

•• t,e,

these additiona1 factor5!
.~.. ~

The fee title owners re-sold to

Cutler and
B.

D~ring

Kart~hner

t~e

and,

entire time from the

filing cf the first action till Defetdant

va~ated

the premises she was

in peril of having •reb 1 e

damage~
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aasessed against her.

This question is

included in the pre-trial order in case
#2148. and. we submit, was a real threat.
These factors are assessed in the portion

of the last mentioned A. L. R. note.

See

Metcalfe v. Dallam 4 Ky. 196 and Liveridge

v. Cples 72 Minn.
on o. 263.

57~

74 N. W. 1109, bri@fed

The nnte then ci+es an application

of +he princiole by our court.

I

quote from

oage 263:
"
. . . • a vendee, when sued
for an instalment coming due prior
to the tjme set for conveyance,
may well defend that the vendor
is insolvent, that he is not, as the
vendee had supposed, the absolute
owner of the premises, but himself
holds merely an executory contract
to purchase the same, together with
other lands, and is in default thereunder, and that the vendee has declined to make payment merely because he fears that his payments will
be lost, and is willing to make pay-
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ment when it can be safely made to
some person in a position to carry
out the vendor's contract. Such at
least is the rule where the action is
brought in a court having equity jurildiction.
Tremonton Invest. Co. v.
Horne (1921) 5~ Utah, 156, 202 P. 527."
The Tremonton case varies slightly
from our case, but certainly equity has
a strong purpose in intervening on behalf
of the Defendant here.

On june 15th the

Plaintiffs were $3,000.00 behind, new owners
held the contract and it certainly would not
have been prudent for Defendant to go on
pouring her payments down the hole.
True, a corporation in which Plaintiffs
held a large interest did re-acquire the
May 27th contract in August, but not even
then, nor till after Defendant vacated did
Plaintiffs take title in their own names.
During that period Plaintiffs had the capacity
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to perform as to Doferdant if they wanted
but she had no capac1ty to require them

to,

to

o ~ r f o r m ..

I n o t he r wo .,.. d s ,

across a better deal,
Company could

;u~t

a~

r ..

if t h e y r an

neyard Investment

easily have entered

into a contract witn a third party.

In

th~

conversation in mid-August

\,eavi tt told

D~f end ant

thi"lgs oute

She said she would pay nothing

tnl~ss

out.

t~tey

h~

was stra.ightening

got the matter straightened

He made no effort to do this or t·-

set her mind at rest.
happen~d

The next thing that

was the filing of #2207.

Could

Defendant be blamed for giving up in despair 7
It is not reasonable to expect her t.J con-

tinue to run the risk of treble
under #2J48, which was

stil~

damag~s

pending,

wh~le

these maneuvers went on.
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Plaintiffs urge upon the Court a rule
of damages which I submit is unsound.

The

correct rule is set forth in the Utah case
of McBride vp Stewart, 68 Utah 14 249 Pac.
114, 48 A. L. R. 267.

I quote from the

opinion:
" . . • the injured party has an
election to pursue one of three
remedies: 1. He may treat the
contract as rescinded and recover
upon quantum meruit so far a5 he
has performed, or 2. He may keep
the contract alive for the benefit
of both parties, being at all times
himself ready and able to perform
and at the end of the time specified
in the contract for performance, sue
and recover under the contract, or
3. He may treat the repudiation as
putting an end to the contract for
all purposes of performance and sue
for the profits he would have realized
if he had not been prevented from
performing."
In our case, we have treated the contract as rescinded and are suing for what
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-JQthe Defendant paid

he rea5onab e

less

rental value of the prem1ses, th• f1rst
~ta.ted

alternative

also announced

Investment

1r1

Compa:n~

above.
McK~

v

i',lis rule

~s

llar Real Estate and

.,_P~,

62, Utah 97,

?.]8 Pac. 128.

Tne contract between

ynn and Defendant
Srr~et

f1xed thP value of the Coronado

at

prope~ty

the

$~,ooo~oc_

rela~ive

~rre

An inquiry into

values of the

evant and is an

pr~perties

;s

to varv the

at~empt

term5 of a llt'T;tten agreement with utterly
no

bas~s

to do so.

tion of

h~

re"

a ive val1es o

th~

p oper ties

was nut raised, nur was tne amount uf the
down

pa.trrit:TlL

vr (1urin~
a..

an

'Y

rea~ on

-:-

1m""'

cue:s-+-~uued

'te pre--tr1a1

p ~ur

to

tr

by the

p

1

~ading:5

cvnfeL·en '"',nor
.: a J

7

and f u 1 t h 1 ~

was pr0per 1 y exc 1 1dea from cons id
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at ion .
POINT II

As to Plaintiffs contention that they
should have been allowed to amend to show

that Defendant had removed certain personal

property from the premises.

Plaintiffs

preaented this proposal at the start of
trial, although many months had elapsed
since suit was filed, depositions had been
taken and pre-trial was complete (T. 1).
Prom

Mr~

Puller's statement it appears

that the property he is talking about
originally belonged to Mrs. Lynn, was not
a

part of the inventory and did not ever

become the property of the Plaintiffs (T.
6, 7).

This is why he denied that it should
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-21have been a part of nis case in cl ief, i.
u

converted proper+y.

tiffs are say1ng
a th\rc1 person

9

'You

to~k

on the

~eft

e+fe~~

rhus :tn

prope~ty

value you

P'!_a~n

which

J)rf!lll'ise:s,

and

c~~m

:he

so we are entitled to a oenefit

E •

received"'~

As the trial ccurt poi.n ~ed out, Lynn
thr~

hei·self would be

one to

r:~laim

·JuJ·sement if the property were

Defendant (T. 7).

~

~ourse,

wa:s ·~ot

~.t

(T.

7).

we donrt concede that the prope

~>aid

tnat is a

aken by

Mr., Fuller even conceded

thil.i. she might claim payment for

vf

e1m-

f o J.

que~t:t

H.owev~

•

tr

c. even admi 1 i 1ng

on of fact, pr.oper.t., belong

to ;ynn which we rnig1t have

tak~>·n,

would

not entitle Plain•1f&s to a cre!i• against
da.mages owed us.

I a 1 so wan t

t L~

p o in t

>u t t ti at the · e
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n~

wa~

never
Full~r

any~hing

before the Court.
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